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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 3, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW 12

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Review of National Defense Strategy (U)

Throughout the post-war era, we have successfully provided for the security of the United States and for the furtherance of our security interests in the world by following a broad national defense strategy of containment. We have sought successfully, through the combined use of all elements of our national power, and in concert with our Allies, to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating the concentrations of industrial power and human capacity that are Western Europe and East Asia, and to protect our common security interests in other regions of the world. Central to this broad strategy have been the concepts of deterrence and flexible response. To deter potential adversaries, we have had to make clear that we, and our Allies, have the means and the will to respond effectively to coercion or aggression. But, our policy has been to avoid specifying exactly what our response would be, confronting potential adversaries instead with a broad range of potential responses. Within that range of responses, U.S. general purpose forces have provided the military capabilities that have made credible the conventional component of our national security strategy, and U.S. nuclear forces have served as the ultimate guarantors of our security. (U)

Partly due to the success of this national security strategy, a new set of challenges and uncertainties confronts us. Our rebuilding of American military strength has served as an essential underpinning to our past success. We must preserve that strength as the underpinning for our future efforts. Changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policies, including some announced but not yet implemented, are hopeful signs. But it would be reckless to dismantle our military strength and the policies that have helped make the world less dangerous, and foolish to assume that all dangers have disappeared or that any apparent diminution is irreversible. (U)

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Therefore, I hereby direct a review of our basic national defense strategy. The review should produce a series of reports, as described below. These reports will be presented seriatim to the National Security Council for review and discussion. Following this discussion, I anticipate providing specific decisions and guidance that will better focus the remaining parts of the review, and, perhaps, identification of new issues for further study. The goal is a sound, thoughtful, iterative process that will constitute a careful, yet timely, review of our national defense strategy, of the principal forces that will be available to support that strategy, and of the contribution that can be made by arms control policy. (U)

I do not expect this review to invent a new defense strategy for a new world. On the contrary, I believe that our fundamental purposes are enduring and that the broad elements of our current strategy -- our Alliances, our military capabilities -- remain sound. This defense review should assess how, with limited resources, we can best maintain our strength, preserve our Alliances, and meet our commitments in this changing but still dangerous world. (U)

- I. Current U.S. Defense Posture and Key Trends and Uncertainties: As a baseline for the review, this section should briefly describe current U.S. defense strategy and U.S. military forces. It should then analyze key trends and uncertainties that have affected and/or may in the next five to ten years affect the appropriateness and effectiveness of our national defense strategy. These trends and uncertainties should include but not be limited to the following:

Soviet Union

- Do we expect major technological surprises in Soviet general purpose forces, strategic nuclear forces or in the area of strategic defense that could significantly reduce the effectiveness of the U.S. deterrent? Could we detect such developments? Could the Soviet Union compete effectively in a technological arms race in these areas, or offset U.S. technological advances by other means? (C)
- How might reductions in Soviet and Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces already announced (if carried out), additional plausible unilateral or negotiated reductions, doctrinal and organizational changes, trends in Soviet weapons production, and political changes in Eastern Europe affect the threat to the U.S. and its Allies? How does the state of the Soviet economy affect the ability of the Soviet Union to wage sustained conventional war? What would be the indicators of a genuine change in the Soviet approach to security issues and a real lessening of the threat to the West? Would unilateral force structure reductions or other moves on our part slow or accelerate Soviet unilateral reduction efforts? (C)

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- How do the Soviets see their position in the world? How do they see the long-term trends they are facing both externally (e.g., the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, China, and the European Community) and internally (e.g., economic, technological)? (C)
- How aggressive do we expect the Soviet Union to be in trying to preserve or expand its influence in the Third World? What will be the role of Soviet military or proxy forces? What are the trends in Soviet projection forces? (C)

U.S. Allies

- What are the prospects for a "European pillar" within NATO? What form will it take (especially as to defense cooperation)? How would our interests be affected by such a pillar? (C)
- What is our assessment of current Japanese defense capability? Will recent rates of increase in Japanese defense spending be sustained? If so, what will be the impact on Japanese capabilities against Soviet threats, Japan's role in the region, and Japan's relationship with the United States? What are the prospects of Korea (or any other Asian/Pacific ally) assuming a greater regional defense role? (C)
- Are there emerging political and economic trends, or plausible sharp discontinuities, that could result in a major departure from the current level of commitment by our Allies to their alliances with us (e.g., popular pacifism and environmental concern in Western Europe, trade disputes with Japan or the European Community, NATO allies force reductions, etc.)? (C)
- Will U.S. access to overseas bases in Europe, Japan, the Philippines, and elsewhere become more limited? How would that affect our military capabilities? (C)

Third Country Threats

- Are there emerging regional powers that the U.S. needs to take account of? What are they? What is their military capability? What are the trends? (C)
- How would acquisition by Libya, Iraq or others of long-range weapons, chemical, biological, and nuclear warheads, and other advanced systems affect the prospect that those countries would threaten or attack U.S. interests, U.S. friends and Allies, or other nations? What role will such capabilities play in changing regional balances of power or in shaping regional

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conflicts? What is the likelihood of continued terrorism sponsored by these States (including hostage-taking)? (C)

- What means does the U.S. possess to deter such threats? What are the capabilities of U.S. Allies and of the States most directly threatened to deter or cope with these threats? (C)
- Will reliance by the U.S. and its Allies on overseas energy and other strategic resources tend to increase or decrease over the next 5-10 years? (C)

Technology and Industrial Base

- What major technological developments of the past 5-10 years will have the largest impact on military forces and defense systems over the next 5-10 years? Have U.S. military doctrine and organization been most advantageously arranged to exploit these technologies? Which of these technologies are or will become available to States potentially threatening the U.S., its Allies and friends? (C)
- What technologies are likely to emerge over the next 5-10 years that could have a dramatic impact on the military forces that threaten us or on the forces we could deploy to counter these threats? What is the relative ability of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to exploit these technologies for military advantage? Do U.S. Allies have any advantages in this regard? (C)
- What are the recent and projected trends in our ability to surge military production in crisis or wartime and rapidly to mobilize and deploy forces? What are the existing bottlenecks? Do U.S. Allies have any advantages or disadvantages in this regard? (C)

Other

- Are there other major trends or possible discontinuities in the international security environment that should be considered? (C)

The report on Current U.S. Defense Posture and Key Trends and Uncertainties should be submitted not later than March 15, 1989.
(U)

- II. U.S. Defense Objectives and Strategies for the 1990's and Beyond: Bearing in mind the overall historical success of existing U.S. defense objectives and strategy, this section should identify any shortcomings and risks in our current strategy and force posture. It should: (a) identify those elements that should continue to guide U.S. defense strategy; (b) identify potential modifications in our objectives

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and/or strategy; and (c) identify new alternatives for further study. The review should identify which of the issues in this section can and should be resolved in the near term (especially if they bear directly on an issue identified in Section III) and which of the issues can and should be deferred for analysis and resolution over the longer term. This section should address, among other things, the following:

- What kinds of reductions or restructuring of Soviet military forces and alterations in the structure of its empire and political relations would be most useful in advancing U.S. security interests? How can we assist in bringing these changes about? How would we change our forces/deployments and security arrangements if the Soviets made these changes? What is the best hedge against a sudden reversal on the part of the Soviets?
(C)
- What implication would reduced Soviet effort to preserve or expand its influence in the Third World have for the structure and role of U.S. military forces and the levels of our foreign military assistance to our friends and Allies overseas? Does the emergence of third-country threats leave the situation unchanged or perhaps render it even worse? What is the appropriate balance between reliance on U.S. forces and building up friendly forces through security assistance or otherwise to deal with these threats? (C)
- What is the proper balance between U.S. and Allied contributions to our common (mutual) security objectives -- contributions military, economic, and political? In particular, even assuming we could obtain a much higher level of defense participation from our Allies, what level of overseas forces would the U.S. still want to maintain for its own purposes?
(C)
- What is the most prudent balance between European and non-European contingencies in U.S. defense planning and resource allocations? Have we bought forces optimized for Europe and left ourselves without sufficient forces adapted to perhaps more likely Third World contingencies? This discussion should inform, in broad policy terms, an analysis of the extent to which U.S. forces should be forward-deployed in peacetime, and should highlight the tradeoffs involved to the degree that forces bought for one mission are not highly useful for other contingencies. (C)
- How have previous U.S. efforts with respect to nuclear arms control reinforced or undercut the proper role of nuclear weapons in our deterrent strategy? What contribution will nuclear weapons (including theater

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nuclear weapons) make to our defense strategy over time -- in Europe, in other contingencies? What do we need for maintaining strategic deterrence? This discussion should include: (1) what the U.S. must be able to hold at risk in order to deter successfully a Soviet strategic nuclear attack; (2) the degree to which each leg of the Triad must be survivable, given (a) strategic warning, (b) tactical warning, or (c) no warning; (3) the impact on strategic stability of "deMIRVing"; (4) the role of the strategic bomber force and air-launched cruise missiles; (5) the significance of emphasizing air-breathing systems over ballistic ones; (6) the degree to which long-term stability and deterrence would be enhanced or degraded by the elimination of nuclear-armed, land-attack, sea-launched cruise missiles from the arsenals of the U.S. and the Soviet Union; and (7) the adequacy of the projected number of SLBM platforms. (C)

- Are there emerging technologies that offer opportunities for reducing reliance on nuclear weapons to deter major conventional assault? Particular emphasis should be placed on the contributions that long-range, highly accurate, conventional munitions might make in adding rungs to the classic escalation ladder. (C)
- What future roles should be played by strategic missile and air defenses? This discussion should include examination of a world in which defenses: (1) are dominant or nearly so; (2) are employed -- where appropriate -- to protect (or render less vulnerable) strategic offensive forces and their associated command and control systems; (3) provide protection against Third World missile systems or the accidental launch of Soviet systems; or (4) have relatively little role. (C)
- The United States relies to a significant degree on space-based assets for command, control, and intelligence. This requires that we understand how U.S. national interests are best served in the 1990s and beyond with regard to: (1) space launch assets and capabilities; (2) a deterrent capability to threaten Soviet space-based assets; and (3) back-up ground-based systems or rapidly deployable replacement systems to replace wartime losses. (C)

The report on U.S. Defense Objectives and Strategies for the 1990s and Beyond should be submitted not later than March 25, 1989. (U)

- III. Force Posture Issues in a Constrained Resource Environment:
This section must begin with a recognition that our ability to meet our defense objectives and to pursue our defense strategy will be significantly affected by the resources

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available for our military forces. Clearly, a dramatic increase in the projected threat would require additional resources, and a reduction in the threat (through unilateral action by adversaries or negotiated arms control arrangements) would enhance our ability to meet our objectives and pursue our strategy within existing resources. Under the budget guidance I have issued for the next four years, there will be difficult choices to make regarding priorities. Because constrained resources will demand that the U.S. take advantage of its traditional and enduring strengths while exploiting new opportunities, this section should also focus on how we can provide high value, competitive leverage from our defense investments in the 1990s. (U)

This section of the study should address what combination of military assets within my 4-year budget guidance provides the most effective deterrent. It should also provide both a mid-term (5-year) and a longer-term perspective on the impact of specific force posture decisions on our relative ability, given those decisions, to respond to unanticipated changes in the projected threat. Specifically, we need to keep in mind what our defense capability will be at the end of the next five years vis-a-vis our national defense objectives and strategy. The analysis in this section should reflect the substantial uncertainties in the current international environment and the potential need at the end of five years' time to meet new and adverse trends in the threat. How reversible are any decisions we may make now to reduce force structure? (C)

Specifically, this section should address the following issues in light of the analysis in Section II:

- (1) How can we make ICBMs survivable? On what degree of warning should they be survivable? How should they be based? How large a force is required? (C)
- (2) What should be the structure and objective of the SDI program? What level of priority should it have? (C)
- (3) What balance should exist between resources devoted to nuclear and conventional forces? What priority should be given to intelligence capabilities that relate to support of strategic or tactical forces? (C)
- (4) What priority should there be for our conventional force resources among: force structure, research and development, modernization, readiness, and sustainability? Is the near-term risk of war such that the U.S. could safely reduce readiness? For the same reason, should the U.S. favor R&D expenditure (somewhat) at the expense of procuring and fielding hardware? Should we substitute technology for manpower? (C)

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- (5) Should we put greater emphasis on U.S. basing and the ability to mobilize and surge forces to critical areas? What are the savings? What are the additional costs? Should we shift more forces from active to reserve? Does the need for visible deterrence and rapid responses to situations in the Third World allow us to adjust the number of forces forward deployed? If we rely more on forces in the U.S. would we be less likely to deploy rapidly for fear of heightening a crisis? (C)
- (6) In which contingencies/areas (other than Europe and Northeast Asia) would threats to U.S. interests and Allies require a substantial commitment of U.S. conventional forces (e.g., Central America, Persian Gulf, Libya)? What is the conventional force structure best suited for dealing with this spectrum of contingency operations? Can we adequately meet special operations requirements (including support of drug interdiction)? What are the current and projected shortfalls (if any)? What is the proper tradeoff between these capabilities and those required for Europe and Northeast Asia? (C)
- (7) What U.S. force structure (within stated budget constraints) takes best advantage of U.S. competitive advantages? What combination of forces (if any) would be most likely to foster longer-term Soviet military developments least threatening to our interests? (C)

The report on Force Posture Issues in a Constrained Resource Environment should be submitted in several sections, as follows:

- Issues 1 and 2: March 31, 1989
- Issues 3 and 4: April 7, 1989
- Issues 5 and 6: April 14, 1989
- Issue 7: April 21, 1989. (U)

- IV. The Role of Arms Control in Promoting U.S. Defense Objectives and Strategy: This report should examine the degree to which arms control can and should be used to advance and support U.S. defense objectives and strategy. The following questions should be addressed:

General Issues

- To what extent can arms control enhance national security and promote strategic stability? (C)
- What is the potential value of arms control in promoting such U.S. defense objectives as: (1) enhancing the predictability of the threat; (2) reducing or bounding actual capabilities of adversaries; (3) con-

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straining the diffusion of threatening technologies; (4) restructuring forces in stabilizing or otherwise desirable ways; (5) enhancing force survivability; and (6) channeling the long-term military competition in directions that ease U.S. security concerns and/or that take advantage of U.S. competitive strengths without imprudently hampering emerging technologies? (C)

- If arms control is to be used to limit or reduce both the strategic and conventional threat, assess the contribution or disadvantages of: (1) seeking deep reductions in Soviet forces; (2) encouraging Soviet force restructuring; (3) reducing Soviet weapon-to-target ratios; and (4) seeking to eliminate certain specific threats such as, for example, depressed trajectory missiles? (C)
- Can other options for negotiated threat reduction be identified which differ from traditional approaches? In addition to negotiated agreements, are there less formal arms control approaches (e.g., parallel, informal restraints) that can contribute to threat reduction? In addition to traditional arms control restraints, such as limits on forces and force levels, are there additional devices (e.g., operational constraints, confidence-building and openness measures, etc.) that could serve U.S. defense interests? (C)

Specific Issues. The arms control review should either affirm or suggest options for modifying the premises underlying our approach to current or prospective negotiations. It should not, as part of this effort, address particular details of U.S. negotiating positions. The review should examine among other things:

1. START/Defense and Space

- Is the existing U.S. approach to START consistent with the defense objectives and force structure analysis discussed in Sections II and III of this review? (C)
- At what point do negotiated reductions in U.S. strategic force structure cease to be consistent with U.S. security requirements? What kind of force limitations should be sought, and what avoided, for their impact on the ability of the U.S. to develop and deploy systems that exploit our long-term competitive advantages? (C)
- What is the security relationship and dynamic, if any, between START and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks? (C)
- Is the existing U.S. approach to the D&S

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negotiations consistent with the defense objectives and force structure analysis discussed in Sections II and III of this review? (C)


- To what extent are continued constraints on ballistic missile defense in the U.S. interest? (C)

2. Other Current or Prospective Arms Control Issues. The review should address security considerations that bear on:

- Further negotiated reductions in theater nuclear systems in Europe;
- Further restrictions on nuclear testing;
- A global ban on chemical weapons;
- Conventional arms reductions in Europe; and
- Restraining the proliferation of destabilizing technologies (nuclear and chemical/biological weapons and ballistic missiles). (C)

The report on The Role of Arms Control in Promoting U.S. Defense Objectives and Strategy should be submitted not later than April 21, 1989. (U)

Next Steps and Future Guidance. As important milestones in the review process are achieved, I will provide the appropriate guidance concerning modifications to the defense budget, including direction on the ICBM modernization program and Strategic Defense Initiative. I also intend the Secretary of Defense, aided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to review, as a separate matter, our targeting policy as set forth in NSDD-13 and provide recommended changes. In coordination with this review, I will direct the Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee to review current U.S. arms control policies and positions to reflect my decisions and the results of this defense review as well as to resolve outstanding issues requiring resolution before resumption of negotiations. I intend that this work proceed in parallel with the defense review so that preliminary decisions on U.S. negotiating positions can be reached by late April. I will provide specific guidance on these efforts separately. (C)



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 3, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW 14

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Review of United States Arms Control Policies (U)

In directing the review of defense strategy mandated by NSR-12, I stated that I would task the Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee to review current U.S. arms control positions and policies both to reflect the results of the defense strategy review and to resolve outstanding issues requiring resolution before resumption of negotiations. The arms control review is to proceed in parallel so that preliminary decisions on negotiating positions can be reached by late April. This National Security Review sets forth guidance for the arms control review. (S)

Nuclear and Space Talks. Not later than May 1, 1989, the Arms Control PCC should forward a recommended date for the resumption of the Nuclear and Space Talks. This recommendation should reaffirm or suggest modifications to (a) the existing negotiating organizational structure, (b) the existing U.S. position on the linkage between conclusion of a START treaty and resolution of existing Defense and Space Treaty issues, and (c) the existing U.S. position that no new treaties in this area can be concluded without the resolution of Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty, especially the large phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk. (S)

Defense and Space. Not later than May 3, 1989, the Arms Control PCC should complete a review of the existing U.S. position on Defense and Space negotiations. The review should take account of decisions reached as a result of the defense strategy review and should result in (a) options for modifying the U.S. negotiating position; (b) a review of the relationship of the Defense and Space Talks to U.S. plans, as determined by the defense strategy review, for defensive systems research, development, testing and deployment; and (c) a review of whether the United States should seek negotiations restricting anti-

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satellite weapons, either in the Defense and Space Talks or elsewhere. Where relevant, the review should make explicit the assumptions used concerning interpretation of and adherence to the ABM Treaty. Draft instructions for resumption of negotiations should be submitted on or before June 1, 1989, following my decisions on options developed during the review. (S)

START. The review of the U.S. START position should encompass the following elements:

- (1) Review of elements of the existing START position to ensure that (a) there is U.S. consensus on the strategic rationale underlying those elements, (b) that consensus reflects and complements U.S. defense policy and strategy, and (c) any options for altering the existing position are presented for presidential review in a timely fashion.
- (2) Comprehensive technical review of the Joint Draft Text to clarify textual ambiguities and to ensure consistency with START policy decisions.
- (3) Review of those areas in which the U.S. position is incomplete (a) to determine which, if any, must be completed prior to resumption of negotiations, (b) to identify options for completing these areas, and (c) to establish a schedule for completing remaining elements of the U.S. position. (S)

To accomplish this review, the Arms Control PCC will:

- Conduct a series of reviews of specific elements of the U.S. START position in accordance with the schedule set forth at Tab A. In each case the review should result either in a recommendation to reaffirm existing U.S. negotiating positions or in proposed options for change. Recommendations for change should include explicit consideration of the impact of altering positions to which the Soviets have previously agreed. (S)
- Identify not later than April 3, 1989, those incomplete elements of the United States position listed at Tab B, if any, which must be completed prior to resumption of negotiations. For each element so identified, establish a work plan to present options for presidential decision by June 1, 1989. In addition, by June 1, 1989, the Arms Control PCC shall promulgate a work plan for completing those elements of the U.S. position not requiring resolution prior to resumption of negotiations. (S)

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- Supervise a thorough and complete interagency technical review of the existing Joint Draft Text. The review should be completed by April 21, 1989. By June 2, 1989, a second review should be completed resulting in recommended treaty text changes to accommodate decisions resulting from the defense strategy review and the arms control review. (C)
- Forward not later than June 7, 1989, draft START instructions for my review. (S)

Conventional Arms Control. By April 14, 1989, the Arms Control PCC will review the concept of stabilizing measures associated with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations. The review will include (a) recommendations on whether such measures can be monitored with high confidence, (b) if not, options for determining what verification standards are appropriate, and (c) options for new stabilizing measures the United States should propose. (S)

By May 10, 1989, the Arms Control PCC will review the concepts of thinout zones and exercise constraints, as proposed by the Eastern Bloc in the Vienna negotiations. The review will identify options for United States action. (S)

By May 24, 1989, the Defense PCC will review the military and political implications of reductions in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe which exceed those in the initial Western proposal in the CFE negotiations. The review should identify acceptable levels of reductions and should explicitly consider whether such reductions require restructuring of existing forces and/or changes in existing NATO strategy. Based on the results of this review, I will issue guidance, if appropriate, to examine alternative arms control options. (S)

By May 31, 1989, the Arms Control PCC will review possible confidence building measures which might be proposed in the East-West context. The review will identify options for proposing additional CSBMs. (S)

Chemical Weapons Arms Control. Preliminary decisions associated with the basic United States position concerning a global ban on chemical weapons production and stockpiling have been made incident to the resumption of multilateral negotiations on that subject in the Conference on Disarmament. Therefore, no further review of United States policy on such a global ban need be undertaken until the results of the defense strategy review are available. (S)

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The verification of chemical weapons arms control agreements, whether a global ban or any other formal limit, remains difficult. No later than June 10, 1989, the Arms Control PCC should complete a review of verification requirements for chemical weapons arms control, identifying those requirements specifically applicable to a global ban and establishing, if possible, a means of certifying the sufficiency of criteria for such a ban. (S)

Nuclear Testing. Guidance for the review of issues concerning the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty requiring resolution prior to resumption of the Nuclear Testing Talks has been promulgated separately. The question of future U.S. requirements for nuclear testing, whether the United States should reaffirm or modify its commitment to the "step-by-step" approach to nuclear testing limitations, and what, if any, additional limitations on U.S. nuclear testing beyond those of the TTBT and PNET would promote U.S. defense strategy and objectives will be addressed in the on-going defense strategy review. Additional tasking to the Arms Control PCC on the development of specific policy and positions for negotiations following TTBT and PNET ratification will await the completion of that review. (C)

Nuclear Weapons Free Zones. By June 10, 1989, the Arms Control PCC should review U.S. policy with respect to nuclear weapons free zones. The review should result in reaffirmation of or suggested modifications to the policy principles the United States uses in evaluating proposals for nuclear weapons free zones and should recommend U.S. policy with regard to all existing or proposed zones. (C)

Naval Arms Control. By August 1, 1989, the Arms Control PCC should review the United States position on naval arms control. The review should reaffirm or suggest modifications to existing U.S. policy rejecting naval arms control proposals as not in the United States interest. In addition, the review should explicitly consider the various proposals in this area made by the Soviet Union and its allies and provide recommendations on which, if any, (a) are in the U.S. and allied interest and should be pursued, (b) might be acceptable in return for Soviet concessions in other areas, or (c) are unacceptable. (C)



Attachments

Tab A
Tab B

START Policy Review
Significant Gaps in the U.S. START Position

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Tab A -- START Policy Review

Procedure. The Arms Control PCC will hold weekly meetings to review our START position beginning on April 12, 1989. Topics are indicated below. Agencies represented on the Arms Control PCC will review relevant sections of the existing Joint Draft Text. The agency's PCC principal will identify not later than April 5, 1989 those areas where they believe existing U.S. positions should be modified. For each such area agency PCC principals will provide the PCC Executive Secretary specific proposals (but not treaty text language) by the Friday preceding the appropriate PCC meeting. The PCC Executive Secretary, or an alternate designated by the PCC Chairman, will circulate an options paper at least 48 hours in advance of the meeting. The PCC Executive Secretary will prepare and forward within one week after the meeting a record of decision recording consensus and a paper setting forth options and agency views where consensus cannot be reached. Where issues arise which require further analysis, they will be identified and scheduled for reconsideration in May. Consideration of options by the Deputies Committee, the NSC and the President will be scheduled on a case by case basis. (U)

On April 12, 1989 the following will be reviewed:

1. **Ballistic Missile Issues** (other than those associated with mobile ICBMs).

- The fundamental numerical limits on ballistic missiles, including sublimits of ICBMs and the lack of sublimits on SLBMs;
- The acceptability of existing agreed counting rules for the numbers of warheads attributed to each existing type of ballistic missile;
- Current United States proposals to ban flight testing and modernization of heavy ICBMs and past contingency proposals to allow heavy ICBM testing/modernization subject to a formal equal U.S. right to deploy heavy ICBMs. (S)

2. **Throwweight.** The existing U.S. approach to reductions to equal levels in ballistic missile throwweight at approximately 50 percent of the current Soviet level; the U.S. proposal to treat throwweight for existing types on an "as agreed" basis (i.e., by attributing a negotiated number to each existing type of ballistic missile) and for future types to base throwweight limits on the greater of (a) the sum of the weight of reentry vehicles (RVs), post-boost vehicles (PBVs), and penetration aids or (b) a normalized value that takes into account the range at which it was demonstrated; and the existing U.S. Throwweight protocol.

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On April 19, 1989 the PCC will address:

3. **Non-Deployed Missiles.**

- The need for limits on non-deployed ballistic missiles and if so, on which types;
- The current U.S. approach to monitoring such limits, including through tagging, perimeter portal monitoring, and restrictions on storage locations; and
- Pre-inspection movement restrictions. (S)

In conducting this portion of the review the PCC may assume that an adequate tagging system can be devised, recognizing that such a system has not yet been demonstrated. (S)

4. **Limitations on Air-Breathing Systems.** The existing U.S. position regarding bomber and air-launched cruise missile limits including:

- The U.S. objective of achieving a START regime that does not constrain long-range, non-nuclear armed, air-launched cruise missiles;
- How to count ALCMs on heavy bombers;
- How to distinguish ALCMs from long-range conventionally-armed cruise missiles; and,
- The range threshold for treaty-accountability as an ALCM. (S)

On April 26, 1989, drawing on the defense strategy review of (a) the relative benefits to the Soviet Union and the United States of nuclear-armed, land-attack, sea-launched cruise missiles and (b) U.S. plans for the mobile ICBM program, the PCC will address:

5. **Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs).** The existing U.S. position that there is no regime for verifying nuclear SLCM limits or bans, which does not entail unacceptably intrusive on-site inspection that would compromise operational security, disrupt operations, unacceptably constrain conventional SLCMs, or jeopardize our "neither-confirm-nor-deny" policy with respect to nuclear armed ships and thus that the sides should instead make non-binding declarations of their nuclear (but not conventional) SLCM plans. (S)

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6. **Mobile ICBMs.** Issues associated with mobile ICBMs including:

- Whether to alter our formal position banning such missiles;
- If so, what numerical constraints to seek on them;
- Whether to consider an option banning MIRVd mobile ICBMs while allowing single-RV mobile ICBMs.
- Whether, and if so how, to modify the existing verification regime the U.S. has proposed in the Joint Working Paper; and
- Whether, and if so, how to address accountability and inspection provisions for "movable" ICBMs (e.g., fixed area, multiple shelter concept). (S)

On May 3, 1989, the PCC will address:

7. **Verification Issues.** Major policy issues with regard to START verification, including:

- Whether to reaffirm or alter the U.S. position that suspect site inspections be focused on ballistic missile related activity and include both absolute inspection rights for certain facilities and challenge rights elsewhere.
- Additional major policy issues raised by a review of the Conversion or Elimination and Inspection protocols. (S)

8. **Miscellaneous Issues.** Any remaining issues. Specific consideration will be given to the following:

- Depressed Trajectory Restrictions. Whether to seek restrictions on the testing of depressed trajectory missiles and, if so, whether to do so via (a) the basic START treaty, (b) a separate agreement negotiated in the START negotiating forum, or (c) an agreement negotiated in a separate forum.
- Telemetry Encryption. Whether to seek a separate agreement in advance of START on telemetry encryption. Whether to ban encryption of cruise missile telemetry as well as ballistic missile telemetry.
- Backfire: Whether to continue to treat the Backfire bomber as a heavy bomber for START purposes.
- Former Heavy Bomber Accountability: Whether former heavy bombers equipped only for non-nuclear weapons should count in either the 6000 or 1600 limits.

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- Conversion of SSBNs: Whether to permit conversion of SSBNs to non-accountable submarines.
- Golf-II Class Submarines and SS-N-5 Missiles: Whether to accept Soviet proposals to exempt such submarines and missiles from START in return for a promise to quickly retire all SS-N-5 missiles and Golf-II class submarines. (S)

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Tab B -- Significant Gaps in the U.S. START Position

- RV Counting Issues: How to attribute the number of RVs for future types, how a missile type's RV accountability can be reduced, and what inspection procedures will be allowed for existing and future types. (S)
- Missile Accountability: At what point in production does a missile or heavy bomber become accountable and thus subject to the treaty, and at what point in the development of a new type of missile or heavy bomber must it be considered subject to limitations. (S)
- Tagging: Whether a tagging regime is technologically and operationally feasible, and, if so, what will be the nature of the tags, how they will be applied, how they will be read, whether to read tags before flight tests and, if not, what if any implication this has for our position on non-deployed missiles. (S)
- Type Issues: What constitutes a "type" in order to distinguish among different bombers and ballistic missiles. (S)
- New Types Definitions: The allowable changes to a missile, bomber, or ALCM type that, when exceeded, would categorize the altered item as a new type under the Treaty's provisions. (S)
- Heavy Bomber Distinguishability: How to distinguish between heavy bomber types with National Technical Means, and whether to require functionally related differences. (S)
- Weapon/Warhead/RV Definition: The definition of "weapon", "warhead", and "RV" for accountability purposes. (S)
- Closeout Inspections: The scope and purpose of closeout inspections. (S)
- Treaty Duration: The length of the Treaty's duration (e.g., unlimited, fixed number of years, until another event, etc.) and the conditions for expiration. (S)
- Restrictions on Future Systems: What, if any, restrictions to place on air-to-surface ballistic missiles and intercontinental cruise missiles. (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 15, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW 17

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Review of United States Non-Proliferation
Policy (U)

I assign major importance to preventing the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and missiles capable of carrying these weapons. Therefore, I am hereby directing a review of U.S. policy on all these aspects of non-proliferation. This review shall be conducted by the PCC on Non-Proliferation Policy, chaired by the Department of State, and should take into account and supplement those being conducted under NSR 12 and NSR 14. (S)

This review is to define and clarify U.S. non-proliferation policy goals for chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and missiles that can carry these weapons. The review should assess the threat to U.S. security and interests in each case, provide a critical re-examination of the underlying assumptions of current policy, and analyze alternative courses of action. The review should evaluate the effectiveness of existing mechanisms used in pursuit of that policy, and identify possible additional or alternative policy instruments, including political, diplomatic, economic or military initiatives. It should address ways to prevent or discourage the acquisition of the weapons and systems of concern, and to prevent their use. Recommendations for new initiatives should not be limited to adjustments to current policy, but should include a fresh look at the entire question of preventing proliferation and use of destabilizing weapons systems. (S)

The overview and missile non-proliferation sections should be completed and submitted for review by June 29; the nuclear non-proliferation section by July 7; and the chemical weapons and biological weapons sections by July 28. The summary and conclusions section should be completed by August 4. (S)

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Declassify on: OADR

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Partially Declassified/Released on 10-3-97
under provisions of E.O. 12958
by D. Van Tassel, National Security Council
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Overview - The overview section should:

- a) Describe the threat posed to U.S. interests by the continuing proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and missile technology. This should include both a current threat assessment (including to U.S. forces and territory), an analysis of the trends, and an assessment of their impact on stability;
- b) Assess the policy implications of the interrelationship among the four areas of non-proliferation and their synergistic effect on each other;
- c) Analyze the relationship of non-proliferation policies to other national security interests in our bilateral relations with affected states; and
- d) Clarify the relationship of non-proliferation policies to bilateral and multilateral arms control objectives, programs of cooperation and defense policies. (S)

Missile Proliferation

ASSESSMENT:

- a) What U.S. programs of cooperation, direct or indirect, currently exist to help allies or friends develop ballistic missile capabilities. (S)
- b) What countries have missile development programs or plans? How advanced are they? Which programs involve multinational cooperation? (S)
- c) What are the specific threats to U.S. interests posed by missile proliferation? What is its impact on the security environment of our allies and friends? Should we be most concerned about the threat to regional stability? Use by terrorists? Direct threats to U.S. territory or forces? About which countries or regions should we be most concerned? (S)
- d) What should our missile non-proliferation objectives be? How should we integrate efforts to prevent the use of these delivery systems with attempts to stop or slow their acquisition? Where should we concentrate our efforts? (S)
- e) How well has the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) worked? What are its weaknesses, and how has it been implemented by the U.S. and other partners? What is the relationship between the MTCR and our interest in space cooperation with other countries? (S)
- f) How effective is intelligence gathering and coordination with the MTCR partners as an instrument of missile non-proliferation policy? How should it be improved? (S)

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g) What is and should be the relationship between U.S. missile non-proliferation policy, our programs of cooperation, and U.S. arms control objectives? (S)

h) What leverage does the U.S. have to affect missile non-proliferation? What are the opportunities and prospects for regional political initiatives? (S)

OPTIONS FOR POLICY

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

1.5
(d) (g)

[REDACTED] (S)

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[REDACTED] (S)

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation

ASSESSMENT

a) What countries have nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons development programs? How far advanced are they? Which programs are receiving or have received foreign help? (S)

b) What is the threat posed to U.S. interests by the proliferation of nuclear weapons? What is its impact on our allies and friends and on international stability? (S)

c) What should our non-proliferation objectives be, and to what aspects of the problem should we give priority attention? (S)

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d) How effective has the Non-Proliferation Treaty been in preventing or slowing acquisition of nuclear weapons capability? Are the assumptions on which the Treaty was based still valid today? What should U.S. objectives for the 1990 NPT Review Conference be? (S)

e) What has been the impact of programs to promote peaceful nuclear cooperation? (S)

f) How effective are the IAEA safeguards? What are the shortcomings in the system? To what extent and in what circumstances should we rely on safeguards to protect against proliferation? (S)

g) What leverage does the U.S. have to affect nuclear non-proliferation? How can we influence the behavior of countries that are not party to the NPT and that have significant nuclear programs? (S)

h) How effective have bilateral consultations with the Soviet Union and other supplier countries been in preventing or slowing nuclear acquisition? Should we do more? If so, what? (S)

i) How adequate are U.S. export controls for nuclear materials and technology? How adequate are the export controls of other potential suppliers? What are the weaknesses in the systems? What can we do to make them more effective? (S)

OPTIONS FOR POLICY

[REDACTED] (S)

15
(d)(g) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S)

Chemical Weapons

ASSESSMENT

a) What countries have chemical weapons programs? What is their nature, and how advanced are those programs? What supplies do they have? What countries share or sell CW weapons or

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technologies, and under what circumstances? What countries sell precursors? (S)

b) What is the threat posed to U.S. interests, territory and forces by chemical weapons? What is their impact on the security environment of our allies and friends? (S)

c) Summarize and assess our present policy on chemical weapons non-proliferation. In which areas has it been effective? What should our chemical weapons non-proliferation objectives be? Given the number of states that already possess or may soon possess chemical weapons capability, and the problem of dual-use, what priority should be given to efforts to prevent use, compared to trying to prevent further proliferation? Where should we concentrate our efforts? (S)

d) How does our position on a treaty banning chemical weapons relate to our chemical weapons non-proliferation objectives? (S)

e) How effective has the Australia Group been in preventing or slowing proliferation of chemical weapons? (S)

f) How effective are existing bilateral efforts, e.g., with the Soviet Union and other non-Australia Group members, on chemical weapons non-proliferation? (S)

g) How effective are existing U.S. export control mechanisms for chemical weapons and their precursors? How effective are export controls by other supplier countries? How effective has implementation been? What are its weaknesses? (S)

h) What is the potential contribution of new technological developments (e.g. new detection and analysis capabilities) to our non-proliferation efforts? How could these be exploited, and in what time frame? (S)

i) What leverage does the U.S. have in the area of chemical weapons non-proliferation? (S)

OPTIONS FOR POLICY

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[REDACTED] (S)
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[REDACTED] (S)
[REDACTED] (S)
[REDACTED] (S)

Biological Weapons

ASSESSMENT

- a) What countries have biological weapons programs or capabilities, and how advanced are they? (S)
- b) What is the threat posed to U.S. interests, including U.S. territory and forces, by the proliferation of biological weapons? What is its impact on the security environment of our Allies and friends? (S)
- c) What should be our biological weapons non-proliferation objectives? Given the number of states which already or may soon possess biological weapons capability, and the problem of dual-uses, what priority should be given to efforts to prevent use in addition to preventing further acquisition? Where should we concentrate our efforts? (C)
- d) What is the relationship of the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction to biological weapons non-proliferation? How effective has it been? Should we encourage the adherence of additional states? If so, how? How can the prohibitions in the Convention be strengthened? (C)
- e) Summarize and assess our present policy on biological weapons non-proliferation. In which areas has it been effective? Are there supplies or equipment unique to biological weapons research or production? Given the dual-use nature of much of the equipment and supplies, what role can or should export controls play in biological weapons non-proliferation? How effective are existing U.S. export controls? How effective are export controls by other supplier countries? How stringent and consistent is the implementation of existing export controls? (C)
- f) What is the potential contribution of new technological developments, if any, to our biological weapons non-proliferation efforts? In what time frame could these be exploited? (S)

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g) What leverage does the U.S. have in the area of biological weapons non-proliferation? (S)

OPTIONS FOR POLICY

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(d)
(g)

[REDACTED] (S)
[REDACTED] (S)
[REDACTED] (S)
[REDACTED] (S)

Summary and Conclusions - This section should:

- a) Assess the U.S. capacity to affect non-proliferation in all four areas, taking into account the full range of political, diplomatic, economic and military instruments available to us;
- b) Recommend priorities for Administration action, including efforts to secure Congressional, Allied and public support for Administration policy; and
- c) Propose strategy for securing the support of the Soviet Union, China, and other key non-Allied countries for U.S. non-proliferation objectives, including possible initiatives in multilateral as well as bilateral fora. (S)

Export control decisions, fulfillment of legal obligations and plans for the 1990 NPT Review should proceed. Any other proposed initiatives which cannot await the results of my decisions on the overall review should be submitted separately for my consideration. (S)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 22, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW 18

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT: Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures
(U)

[REDACTED]

Therefore, I direct that a review be conducted of our counterintelligence and security countermeasures programs for the purpose of producing a counterintelligence and security countermeasures strategy for the 1990s. The review should produce a plan with milestones and resource requirements. (S)(u)

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Partially Declassified/Released on 4-24-94
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by D. Van Tassel, National Security Council

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
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The review will be conducted under the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence and should be completed 60 days from today. (S)(u)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 7, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW 19

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon (S)

Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence are important to the security and stability of the Middle East region. The restoration of lasting peace and security in Lebanon depends on national reconciliation and political reform as well as the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the dissolution of Lebanon's armed militias. (S)

I am therefore directing a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward Lebanon, including a thorough assessment of the current situation and a consideration of policy options for the United States to assist in a resolution of the division of and conflict in Lebanon. The review should be completed not later than July 21. The review should address inter alia the following questions and issues: (S)

PART I: ASSESSMENT

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 28, 1990

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NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW 24

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
CHAIRMAN, BOARD FOR INTERNATIONAL
BROADCASTING

SUBJECT: Review of U.S. Government International
Broadcasting Activities (U)

In light of the dramatic political, economic and social changes in the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, I am directing that a National Security Review be undertaken of the international broadcasting activities of the United States Government. The review will be chaired by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Senior Director for International Programs, and should be completed by May 31, 1990. (U)

In a time of international transition, this National Security Review should provide the basis for short-term decisions concerning broadcasting activities over the next two years. The review should consider the activities of the Voice of America, USIA Television, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), and Radio in the American Sector of Berlin (RIAS). Because the implications of East-West change transcend U.S. interests in the European and transatlantic areas, the Review should encompass U.S. Government radio and television broadcasting to foreign audiences worldwide. (U)

The review should examine the mission of U.S. Government international broadcasting activities in the context of overall U.S. foreign policy objectives. It should consider the future

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Declassified/Released on 6-3-98
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by R. Soubers, National Security Council

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role of U.S. Government broadcasting at a time when many, but not all, parts of the world enjoy an increasingly free flow of information, including indigenous free media and access to Western commercial broadcasting. The review should cover planning, programming and resource implications, including allocation of limited resources to various regions, countries, and languages. The review should consider, but not be limited to, the following questions. (U)

PART I: ASSESSMENT

-- What is the mission of U.S. Government international broadcasting activities? (U)

-- What is the current scope and content of U.S. broadcasting activities? How well is the mission being accomplished? (U)

-- How has the increasing access of Eastern European and, to a lesser extent, Soviet audiences to Western broadcasting and other media changed the need for U.S. Government broadcasting to those areas? (U)

-- How will developments in the international political situation, technology, private sector activity, and actions of other international broadcasters affect formulating U.S. international broadcasting policy and programs for the immediate future and the next two years? (U)

-- Is there a role for U.S. Government broadcasting to areas that have indigenous free media and/or access to substantial Western media? If so, what is that role? (U)

-- What are the current plan and rationale for new facilities, modernization, and refurbishment of U.S. international broadcasting assets? (U)

-- What kinds of audiences are we trying to reach? What measures are used in determining the effectiveness of broadcast coverage and the types of programming used? How much of a factor should audience levels (figures) be in determining program content? (U)

-- What are the language priorities for broadcasts, and how are they established? Should these priorities be re-evaluated or changed in light of world developments? (U)

PART II: OPTIONS FOR POLICY

-- What are the principles which should underlie U.S. Government international broadcasting activities now and in the future? (U)

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-- How can we ensure that U.S. Government international broadcasting reflects and articulates U.S. foreign policy in changing world circumstances? (C)

-- What is the most effective mix (e.g., language services, program content, infrastructure needs, hours, coverage, redundancy) of U.S. international broadcasting activities and programs, given growing access of audiences to indigenous media and Western commercial broadcasting and the likelihood of continuing overall budget constraints? (U)

-- What should be the role of U.S. Government broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe over the next two years? ~~(C)~~

o What should be the role of surrogate radio broadcasting (RFE/RL) to areas increasingly open to media and the exchange of ideas? (U)

o Given current changes, do U.S. programming, broadcast and transmitting facilities, and other assets overlap excessively? What are the likely requirements for broadcast coverage and power needs over the next two years and beyond? (U)

o What should be the status of RIAS radio and television in the context of German unification? ~~(C)~~

o What should be the scope and mission of the planned Israeli transmitter and other technical modernization programs in light of current international developments? ~~(C)~~

-- What should be the role of U.S. Government broadcasting to other areas of the world which remain closed to free media and communications? (U)

-- What should be the broadcast language priorities over the near term? (U)

-- How might current legal mandates for U.S. Government radio and television broadcasting be adjusted in light of the emerging international political and communications environment? (U)

-- What further studies, reviews or commissions should be undertaken to examine U.S. Government international broadcasting over the longer term? (U)

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
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- o Should a review of the overall structure and organization of U.S. Government international radio and television broadcasting activities be undertaken? (U)
- o How might technological developments affect the means of carrying out U.S. international broadcasting? (U)

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "G. Bush".

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 15, 1991

NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW 29

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
 THE SECRETARY OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
 THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
 THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
 THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
 THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
 THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
 AND BUDGET
 UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
 CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
 ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
 SECURITY AFFAIRS
 DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR
 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
 DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND
 DISARMAMENT AGENCY
 ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
 PROTECTION AGENCY
 ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
 AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT: Intelligence Capabilities: 1992-2005

The end of the Cold War and collapse of Soviet Communism already have radically altered the international landscape. The dramatic changes in U.S. defense planning and our new nuclear initiative reflect the Department of Defense's recognition of these changes and a forward-looking restructuring of priorities and programs.

Many new, non-Soviet issues have assumed greater importance for the Intelligence Community in recent years, issues such as terrorism, narcotics, proliferation, economic intelligence, technology transfer, and others. Inevitably, however, the Community's primary mission and first priority has remained the Soviet Union, Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces, and Soviet foreign activities. The collapse of the Soviet Empire and the extraordinary uncertainties in its wake will result in new demands for intelligence information on the former Soviet Union,

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 by the Director, National Security Council
 5-30-94
 692-1137

but should lead also to an intensification of effort in key non-Soviet areas already being addressed. New issues for intelligence attention are being suggested routinely.

CIA and the Intelligence Community have their roots deep in a Cold War that is now over and the threat of a Soviet military that is now struggling at home to preserve its very existence, to avoid its breakup into multiple republic armies. We are in transition from watching Soviet operational readiness to wondering about the control of Soviet nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have been transformed, the Warsaw Pact dissolved, and Soviet activism abroad (especially in the Third World) dramatically curtailed. There is growing interest here at home in our intelligence services tackling new issues and problems. Together, these developments urgently require a top to bottom examination of the mission, role and priorities of the Intelligence Community.

The first step in this effort will be a comprehensive identification by policy departments and agencies of their anticipated intelligence information and support needs to the year 2005. This will require the projection of international developments as well as policy issues, problems and opportunities well into the future. In the first phase of the review, your intelligence organizations (where they exist) should not be involved. Instead, policy officials in your department or agency should develop for your personal consideration and approval the principal intelligence requirements for your organization into the next century. This is not a detailed requirements process. Rather, it is an identification of the categories of political, economic and military information needed for diverse issues and regions of the world. This includes intelligence needed to support our military forces. Beyond the traditional areas of interest, we need to consider intensified intelligence efforts in some global problems and new efforts in others. For example, will we need more and different intelligence information on international aspects of the environment, natural resource scarcities (such as water), global health problems, international research and development efforts, and so on? What kinds of economic intelligence do we need? At the same time, what information are you receiving now that you will not need at all or where you can accept far less detailed knowledge?

The Deputies Committee should prepare terms of reference for this review, and, at its conclusion, integrate and prioritize the requirements of all departments for NSC review and my approval. Departmental requirements should be forwarded for Deputies Committee review and integration by January 15, 1992. The integrated requirements report should be ready for NSC review by February 15, 1992.

Subsequent to approval of a policy-based mission and priorities report, the Director of Central Intelligence will identify resources available to address these priorities, resources not relevant to the new requirements and thus available for reallocation, and gaps where new resources may be needed. Based on the results of this analysis, the DCI should also provide to the NSC his recommendations for structural changes in the Community, organizational adjustments, possible new legislation, and alternative budget proposals needed to address the new requirements to the year 2005. These recommendations should be forwarded to the NSC by March 20, 1992.

Senior policymakers traditionally have neglected their critical role in setting intelligence priorities and requirements. The revolutionary world of today and tomorrow, the huge uncertainties we face, the constraints on our resources, and the need to plan well ahead all make it imperative that each of you take a personal interest in this effort.

The Intelligence Community today is being asked to cope with issues ranging from traditional Soviet military forces to the environment, from economic competitiveness to AIDS. We must establish the proper role, mission and priorities for U.S. intelligence in this changed and changing world. Otherwise, our capabilities will spread too thin to satisfy even the highest priorities and our inability to plan and invest long-term will leave us with inadequate intelligence assets to protect our vital interests and our security.

By Bush

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